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Cosmopolitanism after Derrida:
City, Signature and Sovereignty
Puspa Damai

Signatures of Cosmopolitanism
osmopolitanism in Derrida's works sounds like an afterthought
in comparison to other more recurring themes of his texts, like
'writing', 'differance', 'supplement', 'metaphysics', or 'violence'.
Cosmopolitanism seems to belong to deconstruction, which is often
associated with decentring, fragmentation, and critique of totality
and universality, only as an intimate other, a foreign element grafted
in the body by force, or by miracle. That is the reason why, perhaps,
hardly any cosmopolitanist refers to the issue of cosmopolitanism
in Derrida or in deconstruction, so much so that even Derrida has
written very sparsely on it as it belongs perhaps to the dormant, if
not the repressed, other of deconstruction itself, and it surfaces in his
thinking only as a surprise, an event, or a gift. 1 In this essay I argue
that cosmopolitanism in Derrida is the signature, even the decision
of the other as his cosmopolitics is predicated upon extending unconditional hospitality to the other, or upon the arrival of the
other. Derrida, I contend, radicalises cosmopolitanism not only
by rescuing it from both the Statist model that conceives of it as
world government, and a utopian model that confines it to world
citizenship, but also by critiquing and revising the traditional theoontological conceptualisation of sovereignty and by supplementing it
with a new form of decisionism, which can be called the sovereignty
of the other. His notion of the city of refuge represents the 'other
heading' of that sovereignty, which, in contrast to the indivisible
nature of traditional sovereignty, is shared and divided, and in which
it is always the other who decides without exonerating me from being
responsible for its decision.
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Throughout this discussion I stress the fact that cosmopolitanism
in Derrida converges with the figure of the other itself, hence his
simultaneous reluctance and compulsion to address and approach
it directly. On the one hand, he resorts to several discursive detours
in order not to compromise the 'essential' singularity, autonomy
and sovereignty of the other, and not to 'properize' or appropriate
the other into 'my' homolingual address, but also to put the accent
on 'my' inherently heteronomous nature and 'my' finitude. On the
other hand, Derrida addresses the other as if it was he who was
being exposed to the other's address. The compulsion to invent new
idiom to speak to and about the other, to imagine a new site and
politics of the other is already haunted by the uncanny address from
the other. It is this event of the other's address or apparition that
makes deconstruction aware of its own cosmopolitan unconscious,
which can neither be completely ignored nor fully realised and made
present. No wonder that Derrida's writing on cosmopolitanism is at
best preliminary, schematic, tentative, and approximative; but at the
same time it is, like all surprises and events, intrepid, provocative,
suggestive, and even annunciatory. It owes its provisionality partly to
the textual genre it is destined to take. Unlike voluminous discourses
on 'pharmakon', and 'friendship', 'psyche' and 'spectrality', the text
on cosmopolitanism is just an address to the Parliament of Writers of
which Derrida was a founding member and vice-president. 2 'On
Cosmpollitanism' was published, together with 'On Forgiveness',
another of Derrida's short addresses, in On Cosmopolitanism and
Forgiveness (2001b) as if neither of the addresses were integer in and
of themselves, and as if cosmopolitanism were integrally associated
with some form of apologetics. 'On Cosmopolitanism', therefore,
does not belong to the rest of his philosophical or theoretical writings
in the same way as does, for instance, Margins of Philosophy (1982a).
If this 'address' belongs, as it were to the margin of the margins, or
to what Derrida in Dissemination (1981) calls the outwork 'that
will not have been a book' (ibid.: 3 ), and if like all outworks that at
once lie out of the work as well as occupy 'the entire location and
duration of the book' (ibid.: 13 ), then this short and ubiquitous
'address' posits formidable difficulties for reading. 3
Since it is, as Derrida writes somewhere else, the 'ear of the
other that signs' and 'says me to me and constitutes the autos of
my autobiography' (1985b: 51), the text on cosmopolitanism
could be taken as the 'signature', rather than a minor text of
deconstruction. Therefore, taking on the formidable task of reading
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it could perhaps be the right and the just way to approach Derrida
and deconstruction. However, as in every act of signature that for
Derrida only reveals the condition of its possibility as the condition
of its impossibility insofar as 'a signature must have a repeatable,
iterable, imitable form' (1982a: 328), insofar as 'the signature has to
remain and disappear at the same time' (1984: 56), or insofar as the
signature belongs at once to the inside as well as the outside of the
text (1986: 4), the signature in or as cosmopolitanism is not only
dispersed, distributed, repeated, and reiterated all over Derrida's
works, and is given to be traced only at the moments when it emerges
to disappear, but it also marks the border between his oeuvre and
the world of action or praxis. 4 Thus, it cannot be read simply as
overcoming of the binaries so as to reverse the order of the centre
and the margin, the (global) South and the North, the East and the
West, or nationalism or national citizenship, and internationalism
or world citizenship. Nor can it be read as an act that leaves the
relations between the binaries perpetually undecided. The condition
of possibility as the condition of impossibility in Derrida is what
opens the aporetic or differential space in which nothing takes place
but a decision, an event. Derrida's cosmopolitanism reveals, instead
of being marred by the commonly associated vice of undecidability,
a vigorous and enabling decisionism that helps him bring into relief
the gap between theory and praxis.
Seen from this perspective, Derrida's characterisation of differance,
which for him is an assemblage of different ways, as 'neither a word
nor a concept' (1973: 131) reveals a new meaning. By arguing that
differance is neither just a term nor a concept, he neither implies that
it is an airy nothing nor that it is a transcendental something. Nor
does the letter a in differance simply imply 'spacing', as 'worlding',
spatialising and temporalising; rather it is the inflection of theory
by praxis. If cosmopolitanism is Derrida's call for the world of the
other, which will also be a more hospitable and just world, the aporias
and impossibilities of theory provide opportunities and generate
possibilities for responsible decisions. The texts that bear on the
issue of cosmopolitanism, therefore, are all the more crucial in understanding the states of theory in/after Derrida. At the same time these
texts, as reiterations of the perennial themes of deconstruction,
help us read his earlier texts in a novel way, thereby complicating
the easy ways of dubbing his later writings as 'deconstruction
getting serious' as if to imply that his earlier texts were just frivolous
theoretical mind games. 5
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There is definitely some truth in Rorty's argument about the
'superiority of later to earlier Derrida' (Rorty 1989: 124 ); but not
necessarily, as he thinks, because the later Derrida creates a way
of writing or style as opposed to the earlier one who relied solely
on neologism or word magic. James L. Marsh reveals the reason
behind such readings that claim the superiority of later Derrida. He
argues that there is a strong modernist tendency in later Derrida,
which he distinguishes from the earlier, postmodernist Derrida.
In 'Derrida II', as he puts it, Derrida became 'much more positive
about certain aspect of Western tradition, especially in its attention
to universal ethical rights, to justice, and to radical social critique
indebted to the Marxist tradition' (Marsh 1999: 22). If we agree
with Marsh, then, Derrida's cosmopolitanism will be just another
version of Western, liberal universalism. Are there cues in Derrida
that indicate otherwise? Or his project, if there is one, also betrays
the same Eurocentric tendency to 'present' itself, in the name of
democracy, critique, human rights, justice, as a modern, advanced,
cosmopolitan spirit?
In reply, one can point to a number of his texts where he sounds
quite different from what his critics make him to. In his numerous
interviews, such as the ones compiled in Positions (1982b), Derrida
clarifies that deconstruction traverses the interiority as well as the
ex-teriority of Western philosophy, and he describes his method as
a 'simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between inside
and outside of philosophy' (ibid.: 6). To further elaborate his point,
he argues that all the texts of Western cultures need to be read as
kinds of symptoms 'of something that could not be presented in the
history of philosophy, and which, moreover, is nowhere present'
(ibid.: 7). And this search for the trace of the impresentable other
is what informs Derrida's works on cosmopolitanism. In the very
text in which Derrida is said to have gotten more serious, or with
which, together with some other texts of the period, he is said to have
entered the second phase, 'Derrida II', - 'Force of Law', Derrida
begins by enumerating the ordeal of speaking in English and goes
on to argue that to 'address oneself to the other in the language of
the other' is 'the condition of all possible justice'; but at the same
time, it is not only impossible to speak the other's language without,
to some extent, appropriating and assimilating it to one's own, it is
also impossible not to demote justice to (human) rights as an element
of universality (1992a: 17).
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To instantiate this aporia, Derrida turns to the limits of logocentric
law that assumes that the other is capable of language, 'is capable of
language in general, is man as a speaking animal'; and he reminds
that not very long ago, 'man' meant 'adult white male Europeans,
carnivorous and capable of sacrifice' (1992a: 18). While 'there are
still, many "subjects" among mankind who are not recognised as
subjects and who receive this animal treatment', what 'we confusedly call "animal", the living thing as living and nothing else,
is not yet the subject of the law or of law [droit]' (ibid.: 18). The
carno-phallogocentric or anthropocentric legal paradigm, for him,
constitutes 'the legacy we have received under the name of justice'
which comes 'in more than one language' (ibid.: 19). The Western
tradition or heritage, therefore, is not only multiple, like the multiple
languages in which 'justice' has been transferred, but it also expresses
itself as an aporia or a contradiction, which in this case, Derrida
illustrates with the contradiction between law or right on the one
hand, and justice on the other, one inextricably associated with the
other, but also radically different from the other. Derridean cosmopolitanism, thus, is not based on merely human rights or even on
the (anthropocentric) law that has always sought to consolidate
man's rights, or has attempted to extend conditional and calculated
rights to certain others. Nor is it confined, as Marsh implies, just
to Europe or to the Western tradition. Against precisely such readings, Derrida calls for the invention of 'another gesture', which
neither seeks to repeat Europe nor to entirely break away from it.
The other gesture that he invokes rather strives to 'assign identity
from alterity, from the other heading and the other of the heading,
from a completely different shore' (Derrida 1992b: 30). Derrida's
heading towards alterity, towards the other shore outside of Europe
involves a difficult and more complicated strategy of cosmopolitics
than the one imposed on his texts by some of his readers. Thus, it
is imperative to cut him, as he wishes 'but in more than two places'
(1999b: 81), and it is equally important to show the transaction or
the trace across multiple cuts.
Thus, by reading cosmopolitanism in Derrida as a trace that is at
once dispersed all over his texts, yet that exceeds them all to head
towards other shores, a trace that erases itself radically in the process of
presenting itself, or as a signature that is at the same time in and
out of the text, that 'remain(s) resides and falls' (1986: 5), one not
only gains a vantage point to critique simplistic binaries of later and
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earlier Derrida, theory and praxis, Eurocentrist and anti-Eurocentrist
Derrida, but one also knows how to respond to charges by detractors
who accuse Derrida of lapsing, to quote David Harvey (one of such
detractors) 'into total political silence' (Harvey 1990: 117). This is as
if, to take just one of many examples, Of Grammatology's rigorous
and patient deconstruction of phonetic writing in which the West
desires to hear itself speak, and which, coupled with anthropology,
serves as 'the medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical,
and economic adventure of the West' (Derrida 1976: 10) were not
properly 'political'. If Harvey finds Derrida's critique of imperial
Europe only quietly or improperly political, for Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, he is too metropolitan or cosmopolitan to be political. In her
essay, 'Resident Alien', she hails him for his 'teleopoiesis', which she
describes as a 'structure of touching the distant other that interrupts
the past in the name of a future rupture that is already inscribed in
it' {Spivak 2002: 4 7). Yet this poesis of the 'distant touching', falls
short, for her, precisely because it still suffers from metropolitanism;
as a result, for Spivak, Derrida's teleopoesis remains confined, as
do all migratory models of metropolitan hospitality, to 'arrivant or
revenant, arriving or returning' (ibid.: 47). To redress this limitation,
she proposes to add 'the coloniser as guest' to Derrida's list of the
guests that include 'exiles, the deported, the expelled, the rootless,
the stateless, lawless, nomads, absolute foreigners' (ibid.: 54 ). Spivak
finds the example of this foreigner, whom she calls the resident alien,
in Tagore's Gora.
What is curious here is not only how Spivak, perhaps unwittingly,
succeeds in supplementing Derrida's cosmopolitanism by that of
Tagore's, whose cosmopolitanism, according to Martha Nussbaum,
succeeds in its very failure {Nussbaum 1996: 15). More curious is
Spivak's misreading of hospitality in Derrida, which she relates to
the arriving or returning of the immigrant in the metropolis. By proposing Tagore's Gora as the coloniser-guest, she indeed reverses the
binary of the third world immigrant as the guest, and the former
coloniser of the first world as the host, thereby attributing the role
of the host to the native. But by restricting hospitality in Derrida to
the arrival or return of the metropolitan migrant, she not only overlooks the complexity of the metropolis, to which we will return later,
in Derrida, but she also ignores the intricacies of what Derrida calls
the 'law of hospitality'. Isn't that sort of arrival and return what
Derrida has always criticised as the conditional hospitality of the
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State? Isn't that what he at all cost tries to distinguish his concept
of hospitality from? Isn't that what he calls 'ill of all "rich", "neoliberal" countries' that 'welcome or allow to arrive', according to the
needs of their economies, workers from economically less privileged
countries, especially ex-colonies, 'a work force that they exploit
until the day when another set of circumstances, economic, political,
ideological, electoral, requires another calculation' (Derrida 2002b:
140)? Doesn't he differentiate what he calls 'an ethics of hospitality
(an ethics as hospitality) [or the unconditional hospitality] from a
law or a politics of hospitality [conditional hospitality]' exemplified
by the Kantian universal or cosmopolitan hospitality (Derrida
1999a: 19-20)? Wouldn't he rather start by interrogating the very
distinction between the Gora-guest and the native-host, not only
because hospitality involves language, the language of the hote, hote
as both host and guest, but also because, for him 'the implacable
law of hospitality' is: 'the hote who receives (the host), the one who
welcomes the invited or received hote (the guest), the welcoming
hote who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hote
received in his own home' (ibid.: 41 ).

Indifferent Hospitality
It is not that by deconstructing the binary between the host and the
guest Derrida obfuscates the colonial politics of hospitality. In fact,
the politics of hospitality is the question - the question as to who
gets to ask the question - in all the texts revolving around cosmopolitanism and hospitality. Etymology and conceptual genealogy of
hote and hosti-pet-s (the guest-master), which form the chain of 'two
sovereign powers' of traditional law of hospitality that brings it close
to ipseity, to one's own (Derrida 1999a: 18), and the perversion or
even crimes of hospitality that Derrida illustrates towards the end of
his treatise on hospitality by recounting the story of Lot in Sodom in
which, in order to save his guests, Lot offers his two virgin daughters
as substitutes to the people of Sodom. All of them testify to Derrida's
stringent politicisation of hospitality, in which he critiques the father,
familial despot, 'the master of the house who lays down the laws of
hospitality' (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 149).
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Thus, in spite of some reservations about Levinas's concept of
the absolute Other, about his 'feminism' that only disguises his masculinist anxieties, and his humanism that limits his concept of
hospitality, Derrida nevertheless underscores in Levinas a certain
feminist dimension of welcoming as he notes that Levinas defines
the welcome, or the 'welcoming of absolute, absolutely originary,
or even pre-originary hospitality' on the basis of femininity (Derrida
1999a: 44). 6 Contrary to what Spivak implies about Derrida's
casting of hospitality in the 'migrationary' mode, one finds him overcautious about not compromising the absolute singularity of the
newcomer. 'Pure hospitality consists in welcoming the new arrival'
he clarifies, 'before imposing conditions on them', like asking for a
name or identity paper; but on the other hand 'it also assumes that
you address them, individually' for '[h]ospitality consists in doing
everything possible to address the other' (Derrida 2005: 67). The
absolute singularity of the hote brings in the corruptible law of hospitality, and may imply that hospitality is being the master at home,
and any encroachment 'on my "at home", on my ipseity, on my
power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host' would turn the
guest into an enemy [hostis], and take me, the host, his hostage.
Consequently classical hospitality of the sovereign host is possible
only as finitude, that is to say, only by restricting, filtering, selecting,
choosing, and electing the visitors or guests. Hospitality is coded
into laws, rights, and in the name of protection, it is controlled and
limited by the sovereign State. The conditional hospitality of the
State is exactly what transgresses the imperative of hospitality as if
'the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights,
and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the law of hospitality', which commands unconditional hospitality to the arrivant.
The unconditional hospitality in turn consists, he continues, in
saying 'yes' to 'who or what turns up' before any anticipation, determination, or identification of the arrivant as a 'foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor'; it is to accede to
the arrival itself 'whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of
another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or
dead thing, male or female' (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 77).
The law of hospitality is, therefore, the law of 'autoimmunity', a
perversion of perversion, in which hospitality transgresses its own
laws, its own threshold; it suspends itself in order to protect itself,
it countersigns in order to effect its signature, and it cultivates an
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event of indetermination and indifference, a culture of, to quote his
Politics of Friendship, 'anonymous and irreducible singularities,
infinitely different and indifferent to particular difference' (Derrida
1997b: 106).
To reduce Derrida's 'in-different' hospitality to the migration
model of 'arrival and return' is to misinterpret what he means by
'arrivance', which, for him, is an event that renains 'to come'. The
arrivant, who may come or never come, but with whom is inextricably
associated the event of welcome 'must be absolutely other, an other
that I expect not to be expecting, that I'm not waiting for, whose
expectation is made of a nonexpectation' even beyond philosophy's
horizon of expectation that in advance anticipates, amortises, and
calculates knowledge (Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 13 ). To eliminate
all references to the arrivant in the name of calculable, determinable
and identifiable others is to renounce the incalculable in all events,
hence to renounce justice itself. The other arrival is not predicated
on invitation; rather it is a visitation that exceeds the economy of
expectation, and surpasses the ceremonies of reception. The hote
visits as if it were a surprise, and one receives him without being
ready to welcome him, not in one's name or identity, or at least
without resorting to the principle of sovereign hospitality; rather
one receives as if the guest were the master of the house. Hospitality
par excellence is the one 'in which the visitor radically overwhelms
the self of the visited, and the chez-soi of the hate [host]' (Derrida
2002a: 372).
The welcome of unconditional hospitality is, thus, heteronomous
even to the binary of the host and the guest, to ontology itself. Derrida
clarifies it further in Aporias by arguing that the arrivants (plural)
need to be distinguished from 'the absolute arrivant, who is not even
a guest, and with his arrival he surprises the host, who is not yet a
host or an inviting power' (1993: 34). Insofar as the arrivant does
not yet have a determined identity, it can neither be an occupier nor
a migrant. 'The absolute arrivant as such', he continues, 'is not an
intruder, an invader, or a colonizer because invasion presupposes
some self-identity for the aggressor and the victim' (ibid.). That
does not mean, however, that hospitality must remain merely an
abstract and spectral notion. It must develop into a culture. No
hospitality, Derrida reminds in Acts of Religion, is without a culture
of hospitality, for hospitality is culture itself; therefore, hospitality
should 'multiply the signs of anticipation, construct and institute
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what one calls structures of welcoming [les structures de. l'accueil], a
welcoming apparatus [les structures d'acceuifj' (Derrida 2002a: 361).
These indifferent apparatuses or institutes of welcome that are also
cognisant of infinite difference are called in 'On Cosmopolitanism' 'the cities of refuge'.
Before we go on to dwell on the 'cities of refuge', what is important to note here is not just the inadequacy of approaches to Derrida
that seek to divide his texts into later and earlier Derrida, or more or
less political Derrida, Marxist or anti-Marxist, modernist or postmodernist, and Eurocentric or anti-Eurocentric Derrida. Certain Marxist and postcolonial theories, as we have seen, misread
Derrida's cosmopolitical thinking precisely because it attempts to
invent the other (of) politics, and imagine the other (of) Europe.
Rather, we also need to note Derrida's own unwillingness to directly
address cosmopolitanism, as if that would be tantamount to taking
it as something that already exists, thus, to accede to what passes
for cosmopolitanism, namely, to quote Walter Mignolo's terms, imperialism, Christianity, neo-liberal globalisation, and emancipatory
cosmopolitanism of Vitoria, Kant, or Karl Marx (Mignolo 2002: 158).
As Derrida reveals in his contribution to Autodafe, the journal of
the International Parliament of Writers, 'a cosmopolitanism ordered
by the traditional concept' of 'citizen of the State and the nation'
is not sufficient at all to 'prepare new concept and new strategies
for an international resistance' (2001a: 65). In other words, cosmopolitanism needs to be re-thought away from its trad-itional concept
as world citizenship or world government, which dominates even
very perspicacious critique of cosmopolitanism like Craig Calhoun's
(to cite just one of numerous examples), which demystifies certain
cosmopolitanism of the frequently travelling class. Yet, by subscribing
to Charles Taylor's notion of 'cohesive and self-governing societies',
it reverts to 'active [world] citizenship' for social solidarity (Calhoun
2002: 96). In their essay, 'Four Cosmopolitan Moments', Robert
Fine and Robin Cohen (2002) identify in Zeno, Kant, Arendt and
Nussbaum four major moments of cosmopolitanism: cosmopolitanism
'as a placeless meeting of minds, cosmopolitanism as perpetual peace,
cosmopolitanism as justice, [and] cosmopolitanism as an answer to
social fragmentation, extreme nationalism or ethnic hostility' (Fine
and Cohen 2002: 162). Even in this fourfold approach Derrida would
find varying degree of Statism or anti-Statism, from which he would
detour towards a deconstructive or differential relation with the State.
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He would even distance his position from isolating four individual
moments as cosmopolitanism as for him cosmopolitanism seldom
remains a subject to direct address.

Detours

of Cosmopolitanism

At the same time, all Derrida's detours into cities, hospitality, into the
critique of home and ontology, that is to say, the critique of 'one's
own', and of the host-guest binary, and his foregrounding of the
arrivance, are detours from only one point: the State, which, with its
principle of indivisible sovereignty grounded in its theo-ontological
foundations, its calculative and selective hospitality, and its legal
paradigms that operate to uphold citizenship, rights, and the rule of
law - all almost invariably exclusionary mechanisms - attempts
to freeze all detours, thus reflection and theory, into one moment of
presence or univocal political decision. Moreover, detours are not
simply sites where Derrida indulges in his notorious play of language;
rather, as he suggests in 'Des Tours de Babel', all detours are also
strategic twists and turns, translations and transferences, or they
are politics of speaking or listening to others, other languages; and
above all, they represent sites for 'raising a tower, [or] constructing a
city' (Derrida 2002a: 307). Detours of cosmopolitanism in Derrida
are detours from the State to the city, from the indivisible and exceptionalist principles of sovereignty to the differential and dispersed
moments of signature.
In Politics of Friendship (Derrida 1997b), he takes this detour
in order to critique the construction of the political in Western
philosophy around the terms 'the friend and the enemy'. He starts
by quoting Montaigne quoting Aristotle: 'O my friends, there is
no friend'; which for him 'displays the heritage of an immense
rumour throughout an imposing corpus of Western philosophical
literature: Aristotle to Kant, then to Blanchot; but also from
Montaigne to Nietzsche', who parodies the quotation by reversing
it into: 'O enemies, there is no enemy' (ibid.: 27). Derrida relates
this dictum of the end of the enemy to the post-cold war rhetoric of
the end of history, which, on the one hand, announces the victory
of 'parliamentary democracies of the capitalist Western world'
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that now find themselves 'without a principal enemy'; on the other
hand, this destructuration would give way to 'new reconstitutive
enmities' that would 'multiply "little wars" between nation-states',
and would seek to identify enemies like China and Islam (Derrida
1997b: 77). By relating this desperate search for an identifiable
enemy to Carl Schmitt's notion of the declaration of the enemy
as the foundation of the political, Derrida argues that a spectre of
the enemy haunts Western political philosophy that is destined to
reproduce and multiply the spectre, for the enemy's disappearance
is made intimate to its own disappearance. The end of the enemy
therefore is 'a crime against the political itself, and the retribution
against this crime is 'unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing
neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its
unprecedented - therefore monstrous - forms' (ibid.: 83). The
reinvention of the enemy that not only eludes but also threatens,
due to its public nature, to change place with the friend itself, and
the subsequent inflicting of monstrous violence upon it is the only
way to repoliticise the political. Against this tradition that cannot
be 'thought without knowing what "enemy" nleans, nor a decision
made without knowing who the enemy is' (ibid.: 106), against the
Schmittian decisionism, which is not only nothing more than 'a
theory of the enemy', (ibid.: 67), but also a theory of the sovereign
subject that is free and willful, to whom nothing happens, not even
the event, Derrida calls for a 'passive' decision without freedom that
'signifies in me the other who decides and rends' (ibid.: 68), or to be
more precise, that bears the 'signature of the other' on me (ibid.: 32).
The un-homely moment of the signature is not the disruption of
home by the anonymous world, but by the absolute and singular
other that however arrives to trouble identification itself, by the one
that is the arrivant itself. Allowing the other to come by withdrawing
oneself produces an event in which one sinks 'into the darkness of
a friendship which is not yet' (ibid.: 43). One cannot be it, be there
yet, or have it, but one must be its friend, and, for Derrida, this
solitary friend of the other not only 'overpoliticises the space of the
city' (ibid.: 43 ), but he also initiates democracy to come.
It is the figure of Theuth, the god of writing, who, Derrida says,
is hardly a character in Plato's Phaedrus or Philebus, but who bears
strong resemblance to other gods of writing, especially to Thoth,
the Egyptian god of writing, that plays the role of the friend in
Dissemination. Derrida argues that Plato's visit to the Egyptian
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god is 'neither a partial or total borrowing, nor of chance or Plato's
imagination', rather it reveals a structural necessity, which makes
the Western logos and its philosophemes unthinkable without the
incursion of the 'foreign' mythos. In Phaedrus, Plato presents Thoth
as 'a subordinate character, a second, a technocrat, without power of
decision', as he is just an engineer or clever servant admitted to the
King's Counsel merely as a techne or a pharmakon (Derrida 1981: 86).
But a second look at the figure of the god of writing or pharmakon
in Egyptian mythology will reveal that Thoth is the pharaoh's top
vazir or functionary, and the gods' secretary; and he is also the
son of the Sun king. Thoth, as a divine scribe, therefore, is the
master of the books, or the keeper of accounts; therefore he is
also called the ~Master of divine words' (ibid.: 91). As he also presides
over the organisation of death and he counts the weight of the dead
souls and enumerates the days of life, thus history, he is as well called the
strongest of the gods (ibid.: 92). The figure that Plato considered
contagious and poisonous, a pharmakon because he dulls memory,
turns out to be the scribe of time and history. In fact, Plato, who tries
to comprehend, thereby dominating the god of writing on the basis of
oppositions (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside),
tries to make each of the terms in the opposition external to the other,
whereas in fact, it is writing as pharmakon that opens the possibility
of opposition as such without letting itself be comprehended by it.
Derrida argues that it is the pharmakon that brings the opposition
of the inside and the outside into effect; and, the refore, cannot itself
be assigned a site that it situates. It cannot be subsumed under concepts that it draws, it 'leaves only its ghosts to a logic that can only
seek to govern it insofar as the logic arises from it'; one would then
have to bend, Derrida concludes, 'into strange contortions what could
no longer even simply be called logic or discourse' (ibid.: 103 ).
Even though Thoth, for Derrida, is the figure of dissemination
that ghosts the binary of inside and outside in which Plato tries to
apprehend him, cosmopolitanism is still foreign to the idiom that he
deploys to ransack Plato's pharmacy. Same is the case in Specters of
Marx, which intensifies Derrida's critique of all 'Platonic' attempts
to salvage binaries by, as he says in Dissemination, leaving 'the ghost
behind' (1981: 104). Yet, in this text too, cosmopolitanism never
makes an appearance. Instead he depicts a world that is steadily
wearing and tearing, a world festered with ten plagues he counts
on its wounded body, a becoming worldwide of the world he calls
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'mondialisation' in which '[e]ntire regiments of ghosts have returned'
from the 'economic wars, national wars, wars among minorities, the
unleashing of racisms and xenophobias, ethnic conflicts, conflicts of
culture and religion that are tearing apart so-called democratic Europe
and the world today' (Derrida1994: 80). In order to justly respond
to these ghosts, he proposes not only an alliance with a certain spirit
of Marxism, but also a radicalisation of Marxist critique. Moreover,
he puts forward a project of a 'New Internationalism' that seeks to
profoundly transform international law beyond the sovereignty of
the States by including 'the worldwide economic and social field'
(ibid.: 84). Derrida clarifies that the invocation of the worldwide
is neither an anti-Statist argument nor a simple affirmation of the
withering away of the State. His 'New International' that denounces
the de facto take over of international authorities, like United
Nations, by powerful nation-states, the hypocrisy of human rights,
the states of foreign debts, and the monstrous techno-military
inequality, is 'a link of affinity, suffering, and hope', which is also an
untimely link, 'without status, without title, and without name' (ibid.:
85). It must remain for him a link that is without country, without
party, without contract, 'without national community, (International
before, across, and beyond any national determination), without
cocitizenship, without common belonging to a class' (ibid.). Thus,
by articulating an International faithful to the Marxist tradition,
but without a national community, or a party, or State citizenship,
Derrida not only seeks to dehinge Marxism's ontological bind with
the ghosts, 'with materialism, the party, the State, the becomingtotalitarian of the State', but by underscoring a 'certain emancipatory
and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise'
(ibid.: 89), he also seems to invoke cosmopolitanism that involves
the messianic arrival of the other.
Some detractors may wish to ignore Derrida's highly philosophical
moves towards deconstructing ontology, messianism and the laws
of hospitality, and ask rather bluntly how notions of friendship,
pharmakon, dissemination or the New International (all derived
from Derrida's reading of the canonical European texts, whether
by Plato, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Freud or even Schmitt) relate to
cosmopolitanism. They may argue that, in spite of its radical edge,
Derrida's cosmopolitanism is one from above, in contrast to the
one from below, which Pheng Cheah locates in the works of writers
like Kwame Anthony Appiah, Bonnie Honig, Bruce Robbins, Scott
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Malcomson, and Amanda Anderson (Cheah 1998: 21). There are a
number of ways one can respond to these objections: one of them would
be to bring into play Derrida's notion of 'elsewhere', or 'to come' that
resists the dichotomy of the above and the below, without, however,
failing to evoke a constituency that strongly resembles the 'below'.
In 'Taking a Stand for Algeria', his address to a public meeting
organised by the International Committee in support of Algerian
Intellectuals (ICSAI) and the League of Human Rights in 1994,
Derrida talks about 'elsewhere' by which he means not only taking
a stand for Algeria internationally, but also what he calls in the
address, the 'Third Estate' that lies below the State politics. The time
for democracy in Algeria, he writes, 'will be long, discontinuous, difficult to gather into the act of one single decision'; such a decision
that should take more time may not 'even be able to gather in Algeria.
Things will have to take place elsewhere too' (Derrida 2002a: 302).
In a way, the other has to make decisions for democracy in Algeria,
of course not to allow a 'right of intervention or of intrusion, granted
to other states or to the citizens of other states' but to 'reaffirm the
international aspect of the stakes and of certain solidarities that tie us
all the more in that they do not only tie us as the citizen of determinate
nation-states' (ibid.: 304). Derrida invokes this other, international
solidarity, for he is aware of the limits of the rhetoric that chants:
non-intervention and respect for self-determination, but not without running the risk of being 'at best the rhetorical concession of a
bad conscience, at worst, an alibi' (ibid.). The 'future [l'avenir] of
Algerian men and women of course belongs in the end to the Algerian
people', he writes, but the Algerian future to come arrives neither
from somewhere up high, nor from below, but from elsewhere - the
Third Estate, which says 'no to death, to torture, to execution, to
murder' (ibid.: 307). The only hope of democracy to come is carried
by this Third Estate that in his or her country has 'no right to speak,
is killed or risks his or her life because he or SHE speaks freely, he
or SHE thinks freely, he or SHE associates freely' (ibid.).
Again the 'elsewhere' of the democracy to come is emphasised
in 'Racism's Last Word' (1985a), Derrida's contribution to the
catalogue of the Art exhibition against apartheid organised in Paris
in 1983 by the Association of Artists of the World against apartheid.
In this essay, Derrida likens apartheid's system of partition and
barbed wire to a concentration camp and argues that apartheid remains - as unique manifestation of the lowest extreme of racism - a
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'Western thing' (1985a: 293 ). This resolutely Western state-racism,
however, demands or engenders worldwide response in the form of
an 'untimely' and 'exilic' art exhibition by the artist. 'Artists from all
over the world', he notes, 'are preparing to launch a new satellite,
a vehicle whose dimensions can hardly be determined except as a
satellite of humanity' (Derrida 1985a: 293 ). The satellite humanity
is untimely and exilic in the sense that it yet does not have a fixed
place, it does not yet take place, because its destination remains to
come, 'which is South Africa beyond apartheid, South Africa in
memory of apartheid' (ibid.). This does not at all compromise the
importance of exhibition as the satellite of humanity, which is at
once a 'mobile and stable habitat', and like all satellites, it guards,
'it keeps watch and gives warning: Do not forget apartheid, save
humanity from this evil, an evil that cannot be summoned up in the
principal and abstract inequality of a system' (ibid.). There would
be no elsewhere to apartheid without the circumambulatory satellite
of humanity, no democracy to come without certain levitating to
some height that keeps watch and issues warning against forgetting
the evil. But Derrida also distinguishes the satellite humanity from
European 'reasons of the states' that keep on turning Africa into 'a
giant tableau or painting, the screen for some geopolitical computer'
upon which European states project the bottom lines of the profits
and losses, yet pretend to denounce apartheid 'from the heights of
international platforms' (ibid.: 298). Against the 'dialectics of denegation', the exhibition, for Derrida, 'signs with a single stroke' and
appeals 'unconditionally to the future of another law another force
lying beyond the totality of this present' (ibid.).
In 'Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration', Derrida
speaks of another height and another superiority. He talks about
Mandela's 'My people and I', which Mandela uses 'without talking
like a king' (Derrida 1987: 13) or of Mandela's autobiographical 'I'
that 'reasons and signs in the name of "we" (ibid.: 26), and also of
the force of admiration that affects both his admirers and enemies,
even though the latter do not easily admit it. The force of admiration
of Mandela, according to Derrida, comes not only from Mandela's
admiration for, and reflection on, the Law, but also the 'law itself,
the law above other laws' (ibid.: 15). It is this law superior to the law
of the White man, who does not respect his own law in South Africa,
that lies behind Mandela's defiance of the White supremacist law,
and that is also the law before which he wishes to appear. Mandela's
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evocation of the superior law is not mere reflection of what is called
the Western legal deontology of the Magna Charta. Derrida plays
on the notion of reflection, correspondence and inheritance and
argues that Mandela reflects on, corresponds to, and inherits Western
laws, which the White ruling minority of South Africa fails to do.
But Mandela's reflection also responds to another height, another
superiority and legacy, that of the structure and organisation of early
African societies, that prefigure and 'make visible ahead of time,
what still remains invisible in its historical phenomenon, that is to
say, the "classless" society -and the end of the exploitation of man
by man' (Derrida 1987: 25). Thus, Derrida's reading of Mandela's
The Struggle is My Life does not limit itself to reading Mandela as a
'simpler inheritor' (ibid.: 17) of the Western juridical tradition, nor
does it confine itself to portraying him as someone who mastered
the Western legal tradition in order to turn it against the masters
themselves. By recognising in him a recognition of the superior
law above all laws, the law before the arrival of the White man,
Derrida identifies in him an 'authentic' inheritor, 'who conserves
and reproduces', but at the same time, 'who respects the logic of the
legacy enough to turn it upon occasion against those who claim to
be its guardians, enough to reveal, despite and against the usurpers,
what has never yet been seen in the inheritance' (ibid.).

Cities

of Refuge

No legacy, nor any inheritance, it seems, is without doing some
violence to the heritage one inherits; in the same way, there is no
hospitality without first stepping out of one's house to meet the
hate on the threshold. It is precisely at this threshold between one's
own and the other, or at the border between the above and the
below, and at the limit between the two laws of hospitality - the
conditional and the unconditional - that Derrida situates, what
he in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (2001b) would call,
'the cities of refuge'. The cities of refuge or asylum, which materially
manifest, what Derrida terms in Acts of Religion (2002a), the
'structures of welcome', are placed at the border he shores up from
the distinction between two forms of the metropolis: the City and
the State. The notion of the 'polis' needs to be ruptured into the
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City and the State because for him the State including the non-State
organisations, which are non-State in appellation only as they are often
controlled by the powerful states, are the signatories of violence on a
worldwide scale. Whenever the State is not the foremost author it is also not the foremost guarantor against the violence that forces
refugees or exiles to flee - Derrida writes, 'it is often powerless
to ensure the protection and the liberty of its own citizens before
a terrorist menace' (2001 b: 6). He recalls Hannah Arendt's 'The
Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man' to
argue that while between the two world wars the borders of the states
are flooded with refugees and exiles, the homeless and the stateless
[Heimatlosen ], the right to asylum undergoes a progressive abolition;
it is 'felt to be an anachronism and a principle incompatible with
the international law of the State' (ibid.: 7). Whenever the European
nation-states have bothered to think about the rights of asylum, they
have done so by referring to it as 'the control of immigration', thereby
conflating refugee status with the status of the immigrants. On the one
hand, by conflating refugee and immigrant statuses, the State brings
the rights to asylum back into its demographic-economic interests
or into the rhetoric of its electoral programmes. On the other hand,
by restricting the international law to the treaties between sovereign
states, the State has a sovereign monopoly over asylum seekers. As
a result, the asylum seekers are left to the indiscretion of the border
police, or what Derrida echoing Walter Benjamin calls, 'a police
without borders' (ibid.: 14).
This formless and faceless menace of the police without borders,
aided by new technology, is nowhere more pervasive than in the
so-called civilised states, where, the police, omnipresent and spectral, 'undertake to make the law, instead of simply contenting
themselves with applying it' (Derrida 2001b: 14). It is imperative
now to distinguish the 'border' cities, the cities of refuge, from this
borderless spectrality of the police, already a formidable form of
cosmopolitanism that has monopolised powers of legislation and
decision over what or who arrives at its border without a border.
Thus, for Derrida, cosmopolitanism is always one form of cosmopolitanism against the other, one form of spectrality against the
other, one form of sovereignty against the other, or one form of
the polis (City) against the other (State), hence the importance of
inheritance and decision. 'If we look to the city, rather than the
state', he clarifies, 'it is because we have given up hope that the state
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might create a new image for the city' (ibid.: 6). Creating the new
image of the city is not only reaffirming rights to asylum and the laws
of hospitality, but to even go beyond rights, deontology, and conditional laws of hospitality to 'open up new horizons of possibility
previously undreamt of by international state law' (Derrida 2001 b: 8).
He therefore calls upon the Parliament of Writers not to hesitate to
declare their ambition:
For let us not hesitate to declare our ultimate ambition, what gives
meaning to our project: our plea is for what we have decided to call
the 'city of refuge'. This is not to suggest that we ought to restore
an essentially classical concept of the city by giving it new attributes
and powers; neither would it be simply a matter of endowing the old
subject we call the 'city' with new predicates. No, we are dreaming
of another concept, of another set of rights for the city, of another
politics of the city (ibid.).

Another politics of the city or in Derrida's word, 'cosmopolitics'
does not imply the return to traditional concept of the city, rather it
suggests a rigorous depoliticisation in which the city has to 'elevate
itself above the nation-state' (2001b: 9). But elevating au-dessus
des Etats-nations does not mean that the city of refuge becomes the
legendary tower of Bable that attempts to touch the sky. The elevation
or superiority of the city of refuge is its exceptionality as a space
of immunity and exemption, so far enjoyed only by kings and their
palaces, lords and their castles, and the priests and their churches.
Therefore, by referring to urban immunity and exemption, for
instance to the Book of Numbers where God ordered Moses to build
six cities of refuge, to Levinas's exegesis of 'Les villes refuges' in his
meditation on the Verses, and to the medieval tradition of sanctuary
provided by the church, or auctoritas that allowed kings or nobles
to shield their guests from pursuits, Derrida does not simply repeat
or return to the historical and mythical accounts of such spaces.
Rather, he is interrogating the sovereign monopoly on exception and
immunity, and supplementing it with new, less theo-ontological and
more reflective and divisive forms of sovereignty. He also critically
examines these traditions for the limits and conditions they impose
on the 'superiority' of the city. For instance, he acknowledges that
the Enlightenment figures, especially Kant, inherit cosmopolitan
tradition of Greek stoicism and Pauline Christianity, but he finds
Kant's cosmopolitanism - in spite of the premium it puts on the law

Cosmopolitanism after Derrida ~ I 93

of universal hospitality without limit, or on hospitality as a natural
law, thus inalienable and imprescriptible-compromised by a conditioning logic of hospitality. On the one hand, Kant, for Derrida,
thinks that all human creatures have received in equal proportion
common possession of the surface of the earth; as a result no one
can legitimately appropriate the surface area for himself or withhold
access to another man. On the other hand, Kant painstakingly specifies that the common place covers the surface of the earth, that is
the case, argues Derrida, not so much to exclude any point of the
world or the finite globe (globalisation), but 'to expel from it what
is erected, constructed, or what sets itself up above the soil: habitat,
culture, institution, State, etc.' (2001b: 21). 7 By keeping what is
elevated above the surface as the space of exception, which is founded
on the earth, but not unconditionally accessible, precisely due to its
elevation and edification, to all arrivants, Kant succeeds in imposing,
according to Derrida, two limits on his otherwise universal law of
hospitality: the newcomer has the right of visitation rather than the
right of residence; and for Kant hospitality should remain a law to
be decided upon by the State police.
In contrast to Kantian hospitality that seeks to divide hospitality
of the surface of the earth from which men 'cannot scatter themselves
infinitely' (Kant 1983: 118) and the hospitality of what is above the
earth, thus the capital or sovereign hospitality, hospitality of the
State, of the capital city and its commerce and culture, from which
Kant never rules out the possibility of infinite dispersion, exclusion,
banishment, and expulsion, Derrida proposes the elevated city of
refuge, which is a sovereign space, but unlike the State, it is left open
for the other to arrive without any condition. It is this 'free city'
constructed, but not in order to monumentalise the construction;
elevated, but not as a sovereign head of the State; rather a city,
which is based on the axiome d'incompletude, that, in his view,
should 'reorient the politics of the state' (Derrida 2001b:4 ). What is important to note here is that Derrida does not say the new politics
of the city dismantles the State, or makes it wither away. Nor does
he say, as Foucault does, for example in Society Must be Defended,
that 'we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty'
(Foucault 2003: 27). Cosmopolitics of the city of refuge reorients
the politics of the State insofar as the unconditional hospitality that
the city offers to the arrivant cannot be written into any law of any
State; the unconditional hospitality thus remains above all states,
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their appropriation and domestication; therefore it is cosmopolitan.
At the same time, however, cosmopolitics seeks to tr ansform and
improve the existing law. The perfectability or deconstructibility
of all State laws implies the possibility of the other of the laws, or
justice in the same way as the city of refuge lies on the other side of
the State - connected, but asymmetrical:
It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and
of knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space
which takes place between the law of an unconditional hospitality,
offered a priori to every other, to all new comers, wherever they may
be, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which
The unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining
a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency,
and of being perverted at any moment (Derrida 2001b: 22-23).

The city of refuge at once embodies in a quasi-normative fashion
the unconditional law of hospitality and the perfectability of the
conditional laws and rights of hospitality. It calls for a work of
juridical transformation and calculation without becoming the Work
of a sovereign head, or ontology. Through law, but also beyond
law, it makes cosmopolitics, like justice, an impossible experience
that cannot wait, or an urgency that calls for 'a just response, more
just in any case than the existing law' (ibid.: 23). Cosmopolitanism
after Derrida is an immediate response to crime, violence and
persecution; and the city of refuge for him is the place of reflection
in which 'a new order of law, and a democracy to come' is put to
the experiment (ibid.). If Derrida's conclusion in the address
invokes a 'cosmopolitanism to come' that is not because it lies in an
uncertain future, but because the cosmopolitanism of the other is as
asymmetrical to the time of our living present as are cities of refuge
to a 'globalatinised' world.

Notes
1. There is a glaring absence of reference to Derrida's cosmopolitanism
in major texts on the subject published around or after the publication
of Derrida's texts on cosmopolitanism. Neither Conceiving Cosmopolitanism eidted by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (2002) nor
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Debating Cosmopolitics (Archibugi et al. 2003 ), to give just a few

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

examples, mention Derrida's texts on cosmopolitanism. One also looks
in vain for any references to Derrida's concept of cosmopolitanism in
Breckenridge et al's Cosmopolitanism (2002).
As Christian Salmon, in the first issue of the Parliament of Writer's
Journal, Autodafe, informs us, the Parliament convened in haste after the
assassination of Tabar Djaout in Algeria in 1993, and Salman Rushdie
and Wole Soyinka were its first two presidents. And from the moment of
its creation, it has been involved in setting up network of Asylum Cities
that offer refuge to writers and artists threatened by fundamentalist and
totalitarian regimes. 'Five years after its creation', Salmon continues,
'there are thirty cities in this network' that include cities like Barcelona,
Frankfurt, Salzburg, and Venice (2001: 13 ).
There is at least one more text by Derrida, 'Globalization, Peace, and
Cosmopolitanism' (see 2002b), that directly bears cosmopolitanism in its
title, and no surprise that this text is also his address to UNESCO. Yet,
in this too, cosmopolitanism has been, as if by some internal constraints
of the concept itself, addressed in the company of other associated
concepts. It is addressed as one concept among others, as an other
concept, as the concept of the other, or as the other's concept as if to
imply that one cannot address cosmopolitanism directly, as if, to quote
from the introduction of the collection of essays on the subject, 'specifying
cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to
do' (Breckenridge et al. 2002: 1 ).
It is significant therefore that Derrida's essay, 'On Cosmopolitanism'
appeared in Routledge's series called 'Thinking in Action' (see Derrida
2001b). Recalling this fact is not a lapse into the binary between thinking
and action, but it is an act of underscoring the indissociability of theory
and praxis in Derrida not only in the sense of a certain performative aspect
of his texts, but in the sense of their evocation of the signature, event or
agency which reside precisely at the borders of theory and praxis.
Even very insightful readings of Derrida's texts like John McCormick's
'Derrida on Law; or Poststructuralism gets Serious' (2001) are hostage
to this hostility towards the early, more playful Derrida. That does not,
however, mean that they approve of late style or 'more serious' Derrida.
McCormick quickly adds to qualify his observation about seriousness
in the title by arguing that 'Force of Law' reveals the decisionism and
its bleak association with Heidegger and Carl Schmitt that Derrida
harboured for decades (ibid.: 396).
Derrida's reservations about Levinas's philosophy in general, and his
notions of hospitality, femininity and alterity in particular can be found in
texts like Writing and Difference (1978), especially in the essay 'Violence
and Metaphysics', in which Derrida not only detects in Levinas's thinking
a necessity of 'lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order

I 96

~

Puspa Damai

to destroy it' (ibid.: 111), but also articulates a problem in Levinas's
envisioning of positive infinity in the name of infinite alterity, which, for
Derrida, is possible only when one renounces all languages (1978: 114),
thus all differences or exteriority itself. These reservations become more
incisive in a very illuminating and 'dialogic' essay 'At this Very Moment in
This Work I Am', in which Derrida (1991) locates a tendency in Levinas
to reduce sexual differences and otherness to the height and pre-eminence
of man as a human being, to the sameness of the wholly Other. He argues
that Levinas's interpretation of the feminine other as dependence or the
'initial afterwards' of Man conceives of a Work signed by the Pronoun
He that in turn makes She secondary. 'She would then undersign the work
from her place of derivable dependence', says one of the interlocutors
in the dialogue, but only as the 'last or first "Hostage'" (1991: 434 ). In
Adieu again, Derrida (1999a) recalls the same impulse to 'humanize'
in Levinas, and argues that even though the feminine being has been
made the condition of hospitable welcome par excellence, recollection,
interiority of the Home and habitation, yet she lacks the height of the
face, the absolute verticality of the Most-High. She can speak, but only a
human language. 'There is nothing of the animal in her' because feminine
alterity, Derrida mocks the title of one Levinas's essay and concludes,
is 'the humanism of the other woman, of the other (as) woman' (ibid.:
37).
7. The word Derrida uses here for 'expel' is 'exclure' which becomes more
pertinent here if translated as 'exclude' or 'keep out', rather than 'expel',
which only confuses, because expelling the State (from guests?) does
not make much sense, especially when Derrida is talking about Kant's
condition on accessing what is elevated [s'eleve] over the surface (Derrida
1997a: 53).
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